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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARION 0. 'VRIGHT, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
THERON W. l\IAYNARD, 
Defendatnt and .Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 7566 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This is an appeal by the defendant from an order 
of the Fourth District Court, directing a verdict in 
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, ,and 
from the order of the Court denying defendant's 
motion to set aside the verdict and judgment and 
enter judgment for the defendant or in the alterna-
tive to grant a new trial on the merits, and from the 
further order of the Court, granting to the plaintiff 
a new trial on the issue of damages only. 
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It should be observed here that two sets of num-
bering are employed in the record on appeal as pre-
pared by the Clerk of the District Court. The plead-
ings :and other papers not part of the transcript of 
testimony are numbered from 1 to 55 inclusive and 
in his brief we shall refer to this portion of the 
record by the designation "R". The transcript of 
testimony is separately numbered from pages 1 to 
343 inclusive, and in referring to this portion of the 
record we shall designate it as "Tr.". We shall refer 
to the parties as they were designated in the Court 
below. 
THE FACTS 
The following facts out of which this case arises, 
are established without serious dispute: 
The plaintiff, Marion 0. Wright, resided near 
the northerly outskirts but within the cor1>orate limits 
of the City of Orem. (Tr. 106). His home was on 
the east side of Highway · 91, just north of a slight 
bend in Highway 91. Highway 91 was at that time 
a two-lane highway. (Tr. 7, 45, 80, 107). · Immediately 
north of plaintiff's home was a garage owned and 
operated by the plaintiff and referred to in the record 
as Wright's Garage. (Tr. 4, 106). Two separate drive-
ways lead from Higpway 91 easterly. One of the 
driveways leads to Mr. Wright's home, the other drive-
way leads into the garage. (Tr. 107-108). The exact 
distance between driveways does not ap · the 
• pear m 
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3 
record. The distance between "\Y right's Garage and 
the curYe to the south wa~ variously estiinated by the 
witnesses at from 250 to 400 feet. (Tr. 47, 57, 83, 92, 
148, 238). 
At the time of the accident here involved, which 
was on January 14, 1949, the pl:aintiff had in his 
employ, as an assistant, one Walter J. Mitchell. (Tr. 
4, 109). The regular hours of operation of Wright's 
Garage were from 9:00 A.ni. to 6:00 P.l\L (Tr. 4, 109). 
At the conclusion of the working day and shortly 
after 6:00 P.l\I., on January 14, 1949, the garage had 
been locked (Tr. 5, 109), and Mr. Mitchell was pre-
paring to drive the plaintiff to a parts house in Orem, 
for the purpose of obtaining a part which was needed 
for the next day's work. (Tr. 34, 110). Mr. Mitchell 
owned his own automobile, which was a 1938 Ford 
and which was a light gray or tan in color. (Tr. 6. 
44, 101, 111, 149, 205). The car was ,parked in the 
driveway leading to the Wright home. Mr. Mitchell 
backed his automobile out of the driveway, and onto 
Highway 91. (Tr. 10, 29). Just how far the automobile 
was backed onto Highway 91 is a matter concerning 
which there is a sharp dispute in the evidence, and 
which we will more particularly discuss hereafter in 
this brief. When Mitchell got the car on the road, 
the automobile flooded out or stalled. (Tr. 29, 37). 
At about the same time, the lights on the Mitchell 
automobile also went out. (Tr. 37). The plaintiff 
came from his house, out to the road where the 
:Mitchell car was stalled and told Mitchell to get the 
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car off the road. (Tr. 11, 126, 136). Both Mitchell 
and the plaintiff realized that the car was in ~a danger-
ous situation where it was stalled. (Tr. 39, 40, 132). 
The defendant, Theron W. Maynard, was driving 
his Dodge automobile in ~a northerly direction along 
Highway 91, through the City of Orem and toward 
Salt Lake City. He had with him as passengers, 
his wife, Mr. and Mrs. Raymond Klauck, and Mr. 
and Mrs. M. W. Wiscomb. (Tr. 146, 165, 232, 258, 
27 4, 283, 293). After the Maynard car came around 
the bend or curve to the South of the Wright Garage, 
the Mitchell automobile suddenly "loomed up" before 
them. (Tr. 276). At the time the Mitchell automobile 
was first observed, the plaintiff, wearing white cover-
alls (Tr. 91, 142, 261, 287, 295), was discovered stand-
ing at the right or south side of the Mitchell auto-
mobile facing southerly in the direction from which 
the defendant-'s ~automobile was approaching and wav-
ing his arms. (Tr. 151, 176, 234, 260, 276, 284, 287, 
291, 295). The defendant applied his brakes but when 
it appeared that he might not be able to stop in time 
to avoid a collision, he turned to the right, so as to 
pass in front of the Mitchell automobile. As the 
defendant's car neared the ,position where the plain-
tiff was standing, the plaintiff ran, or jumped directly 
in front of the defendant's automobile which collided 
with him. (Tr. 40, 152, 185, 261, 276, 295). As a result 
of the collision aforesaid, the plaintiff sustained per-
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sonal injuries, the details of which need not be related 
here. 
The defendant's automobile came to rest in a 
snowbank, a short distance past the point of impact. 
The plaintiff was discovered lying in the snow bank 
to the right of the defendant's vehicle with one foot 
just under the right running board. (Tr. 30, 41, 60, 153, 
154, 186, 263, 271, 272, 295). 
The Maynard automobile was not observed by 
either :Mitchell or the p1aintiff until it was only a 
short distance from the Mitchell automobile, notwith-
standing the fact that there was an unobstructed 
view to the south for a distance of several hundred 
feet. Mitchell testified that he first saw the Maynard 
ear when it was nearly on top of him. (Tr. 40). The 
plaintiff testified that the Maynard car was clear off 
the paved portion of the highway when it was first 
observed by him (Tr. 116), and about 50 to 60 feet 
away. (Tr. 133). In view of the testimony of the 
investigating officers that the distance travelled by 
the Maynard vehicle from the time it first left the 
paved portion of Highway 91, to the time it came to 
rest in the snowbank, north of the point of impact 
was only 52 feet (Tr. 209, 210, 225), it is apparent 
that the Maynard car could not have been more than 
25 or 30 feet away from the plaintiff when it was 
first observed by him. 
It is clear from the testimony of all of the eye 
witnesses to the accident, that the plaintiff ran directly 
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into the poath of the Maynard automobile. The testi-
mony of Mitchell was as follows (Tr. 40, 41): 
"'Q. And that was while :Mr. Wright was 
t:;ignaling 1? 
''A. Yes. 
"Q. And he l ff h h' h was c ear o t e 1g way at 
that time~ 
''A. Yes. 
"Q. And then Mr. Wright ran to the front 
of your car, didn't he? 
''A. Yes. 
"Q. Right into the path of Mr. M1aynard's 
auton1obile? 
''A. Yes. 
"Q. And if Mr. Wright had stayed where 
he was he wouldn't have been hit, would he? 
".MR. McCuLLOUGH: Object to it on the 
ground it is problematical, immaterial, irrelevant. 
''MR. CHRISTENSEN: I will withdraw it. 
'' Q. Mr. Maynard's ear didn't strike your 
car at all, did it? 
"A. No. Not that I know of." 
The testimony of the plaintiff was as follows 
(Tr. 116): 
'' Q. You turned around. Which direction 
did you face ? 
''A. Turned around and faced the south. 
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• · Q. F·acing this on-coming autOino:bile f 
•· A. Yes. And the first thing that entered 
1ny n1ind was that he was going to hit me against 
the side of this car. So . I took off. That's 
all I remember. 
• 'Q. Which way did you go f 
'' ~\.. Brother, I took off. I took off for 
the snowbank on the east side of the road, 
towards my house. 
'' Q. Did you observe where the ~Iaynard 
car was traveling in relation to the concrete 
highway'? 
"A. It was clear off of the highway the only 
time I saw it. 
"Q. And that's off which direction~ 
"A. That's off east of the highwa.y." 
(Italics added.) 
The testimony of the defendant was as follows 
(Tr. 152): 
''A. I had to make a mental decision on 
what to do. There was traffic coming from the 
north. I couldn't go to the left without crash-
ing head-on. I had five passengers in my car 
to consider besides the man standing at the 
side of the car. I applied my brakes and my 
car slid directly at the stalled car. And I felt 
that if I continued in that course I would pin 
that man between the two cars, between the 
front end of my car and the side of the stalled 
automobile. So I pulled my car to the right, 
and played my brakes, to give me some trac-
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tion to get to the right of the stalled auto-
mobile, and my car took hold, and I went to 
the right. 
'' Q. When you say your car took hold, 
what do you mean by that? 
''A. The steering apparatus took hold, and 
I veered to the right and avoided hitting the 
car broadside. 
"Q. Now did anything else happen at that 
time? 
"A. At about-at the point I got to, almost 
to th(J;.t automobile, I had pulled to the right, 
and was avoiding it, Mr. Wright broke from in 
front of it and jumped right in front of my 
automobile. 
"Q. Did your automobile strike Mr. Wright¥ 
"A. My automobile struck Mr. Wright." 
(Italics added.) 
Mr. Maynard also testified on cross-examination 
as follows {Tr. 185) : 
'' Q. Then you continued on past the point 
where you say that you struck Mr.-did you 
see Mr. Wright when you hit him~ 
"A. When he lunged in front of me, I 
definitely hollered as loud as I could, 'No, 
no, no,' just before the point of impact. 
'' Q. How far were you away then, when 
you hollered, 'No, no, no'~ 
''A. I was practically to the car, and he 
dashed in front of me, as I hollered it out. 
I 
I 
' 
I 
I 
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'• Q. In other words, he ran over toward 
the side of the road? 
''A. That's right, from his position. 
"Q. And you caught him approximately how 
far east of the Ford automobile, how far had he-
'' A. Oh, perhaps two or three feet, of the 
front end of the Ford automobile." 
The testimony of Mrs. Amy Kl·auck was as fol-
lows (Tr. 261): 
''A. \Yell, all I can say, ·we tried to turn, 
but the gentleman objected. 
'' Q. Well, the Court overruled him on that. 
You may answer it. 
''A. Tried to turn. There was on-coming 
traffic from the north, and had we turned in 
the usual left hand to pass, trying to get around 
that, we would have hit the on-coming traffic, 
so he turned to the left. As we got to the car-
"Q. Just a moment-
,, A. Or to the right, I beg your pardon. 
We turned to the right. And as we got to the 
car, this man jumped in front of us .. '' (Italics 
added.) 
The testimony of Mrs. Maynard was as follows 
(Tr. 276): 
''A. We didn't go to the left. There was 
traffic coming, so we turned to the right. And 
just as we got in-just before we went in front 
of the car, Mr. 'Wright jumped in front of us." 
(Italics ·added.) 
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The lights of the defendant's automobile were on 
lo\v beam at the time the accident occured. (Tr. 298, 
309). 
No specific testimony was adduced on behalf of 
the plaintiff with respect to the speed of the Maynard 
automobile. The passengers in the Maynard auto-
mobile estimated his speed from 20 to 35 miles per 
hour at the time the plaintiff was first observed, with 
most of them fixing the speed from 25 to 30 miles 
per hour. (Tr. 173, 249, 259, 275, 284, 298). They 
estimated the speed at the time the Maynard car 
came into contact with the snowbank at 8 to 10 miles 
per hour. (Tr. 248). 
It is undisputed that the Maynard car came to 
rest in ,a snowbank in such fashion that the front 
and right side of the car were embedded in the snow. 
Witnesses on behalf of the plaintiff testified that the 
" car was completely into the snowbank, except for the 
-, 
I 
' J I 
I 
left wheel. (Tr. 41, 55, 79, 96). Witnesses on behalf ' I 
of the defendant testified that the left side of the 
car and the rear wheels were entirely free of the 
snowbank. (Tr. 153, 155, 208, 222). 
Byron Jensen testified that on June 8, 1949, he 
examined the lights of defendant's ear for purposes 
of the state inspection law and found them to be in 
good order and in compliance ·with state require-
ments. (Tr. 254). A foundation for his testimony 
was laid by testimony of the defendant, that his 
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lights had not been adjusted, replaced or repaired 
between January 14, and June 8, 1949. (Tr. 163). 
~\~ to mo~t of the other facts in the case, there 
is a Yt>n· sharp dispute in the evidence. With respect 
to the width of the road, the plaintiff and certain 
witnes:se~ called on his behalf testified that the main 
portion of the road was :27 feet ·wide with an additional 
four-foot paved shoulder on each side, making an 
overall width of 35 feet. (Tr. 107). The pl·aintiff 
and the w·itnesses who testified on his behalf also 
testified that the shoulder of the road had been cleared 
to a distance of 12 to 15 feet east of the easterly edge 
of the paved portion of the highway. (Tr. 80, 93, 118). 
There is no dispute that . there was a large snowbank 
running along the east edge of the road approximately 
3 to 3lf2 feet high and some distance east of the ea3t 
edge of the paved portion of the road. 
Officers Evans and Ingersoll, members of the State 
Highway Patrol, who had investigated the accident, 
were called and testified on the part of the defendant. 
They stated that hy actual measurement the width 
of the paved portion of the road was 27 feet including 
the four-foot shoulders. (Tr. 207, 210, 214, 215, 219, 223). 
They estimated that the dist·ance at the side of the 
road cleared of snow at 10 to 12 feet. (Tr. 210, 215, 
216, 218, 224). Klauck estimated the cleared distance 
at 7 to 8 feet. (Tr. 305). 
There is also a sharp dispute in the evidence as 
to the condition of the road at the time of the acci-
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dent. The witnesses called on behalf of the plaintiff 
testified that the highway was either dry, or damp, 
or wet. They all testified that there was no ice on 
Highway 91 or that if there was it was merely splotchy 
and that generally the road was free of ice and hard 
packed snow. They also testified that the weather 
was warm and thawing and that there was slush at 
the sides of the road. (Tr. 33, 47, 60, 65, 67, 72, 98, 117, 
135). To the contrary, all of the occupants of the 
Maynard vehicle as well as both of the patrolmen who 
investigated the accident, testified very clearly and 
positively that the roads were entirely covered with 
'a sheet of glare ice and that they were extremely 
slick and slippery. (Tr. 147, 167, 209, 219, 222, 223, 224, 
227, 229, 232, 237, 259, 260, 265, 275, 280, 283, 284, 285, 
293, 300, 301). 
There is likewise a sharp dispute in the evidence 
as· to how far the Mitchell vehicle extended into High-
way 91 from the driveway leading into the plaintiff's 
home. The witnesses for the plaintiff who testified 
to this fact, fixed the position of the Mitchell car at 
somewhere near the east edge of the paved portion 
of the road. Mitchell testified that the rear wheels 
were just over the east edge of the paved portion of 
the highway. (Tr. 10, 38). The plaintiff testified that 
the rear bumper of the Mitchell car was about even 
with the west edge of the four-foot paved shoulder of 
Highway 91. ( Tr. 10, 38, 45, 90, 114, 115). Contrari-
wise, all the occupants of the Maynard automobile, 
testified that the Mitchell automobile was squarely 
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13 
astride the right hand or northbound driving lane of 
Highway 91, con1pletely blocking passage to north-
bound traffic. ( Tr. 150, 233, 260, 283, 295). 
It should be o:bserved here that it was stipulated 
by counsel for the plaintiff that the length of the 
Mitehell vehicle was approximately 15 feet. (Tr. 131). 
There is no dispute that the lVIaynard automobile 
passed between the front end of the Mitchell auto-
mobile and the snowbank to the east of Highway 91. 
The left rear fender of the Maynard automobile scraped 
against the bumper of the Mitchell automobile in pass-
ing in front of it. Otherwise, there was no contact 
between the two vehicles. (Tr. 41, 131-132). Of nece8-
sity therefore, there must have been a space of at 
least 6 to 8 feet between the front end of the Mitchell 
automobile and the snowbank. Assuming a minimum 
distance of 6 feet between ·the front bumper of the 
Mitchell car and the snowbank, and assuming the 
length of the Mitchell automobile to be 15 feet, the 
rear end of the Mitchell automobile must have been 
at least 21 feet west of the snowbank, which would 
mean that it would have to protrude substantially into 
the paved portion of Highway 91. 
It should also be observed that there is a con-
flict in the evidence as to whether there was on-
coming traffic from the north at the time the collision 
occurred. Both the plaintiff and Mitchell testified that 
they looked to the north immediately prior to the 
accident and that there was no traffic approaching 
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from the north at that time. (Tr. 32, 115, 135). How-
ever, the defendant, and several passengers in his car, 
testified definitely that there was on-coming traffic 
from the north. (Tr. 149, 162, 261, 275, 276, 294, 298). 
The defendant also testified that the plaintiff had 
stated to him that he, the plaintiff, did not hold him, 
the defendant, in any way responsible for the accident. 
Mr. Reese James \Villiams, who was a patient in the 
same room in the hos-pital as the plaintiff, testified 
to a similar statement made by the plaintiff. (Tr. 161, 
201, 202). This testimony was of course denied by 
the plaintiff. (Tr. 328). The statement purportedly 
made by the plaintiff, as testified to by the defendant 
and by Williams, could have been believed by the 
jury as being an admission on the part of wright 
that he realized that the def.endant had done every-
thing possible to avert the accident and/or that Wright 
himself was at fault in having jumped in front of 
the defendant's automobile at the last moment. 
There is abundant evidence in the record from 
which a jury could find that the defendant was travel-
ing at a speed of about 25 to 30 miles per hour; that 
he discovered the plaintiff standing in front of the 
Mitchell vehicle squarely astride his path of travel; 
that at the time the plaintiff was first discovered, he 
was waving his arms up and down; that the defendant 
fearing that it would he impossible to bring his car 
to a complete stop in order to avoid crushing the 
plaintiff against the· Mitchell automobile and being 
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unable to turn to the left because of approaching-
traffic from the north, turned his car to the rig-ht; 
that the accident would have been completely averted 
had not the plaintiff at the last mOinent jumped directly 
into the pathway of the :Maynard automobile. (Tr. 
13:2. 153). 
Fron1 this evidence the jury might have concluded 
that the defendant was in the exE;rcise of reasonable 
care and did everything possible to avoid the accident; 
that the plaintiff negligently placed himself in a posi-
tion ·which exposed himself unnecessarily to the perils 
of vehicular traffic on the highway; that the plaintiff 
failed to keep a proper, or any lookout for other 
v;ehides on the highway; and that by reason thereof 
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence which 
was the proximate cause of the accident; or that the 
accident in view of all the facts and circumstances 
was unavoidable. 
At the conclusion of the trial, both parties made 
motions for directed verdicts. (Tr. 335, 336, 337). The 
motion of the defendant was summarily denied. After 
argument, the motion of the plaintiff was granted. 
The jury returned a verdict, pursuant to the direction 
of the Court, in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of 
$1,004.44. (R. 44). It is very interesting to observe 
that the jury allowed the plaintiff only $480.00 for 
general damages, and that all the items of special 
damages claimed by the plaintiff were cut squarely 
in half by the jury although there was no dispute in 
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the evidence as to most of the items of special dam-
ages claimed by the plaintiff. (R. 44). This to our 
mind is a very striking demonstration that the jury 
regarded the case as one of no liability and would 
have returned a verdict of no cause of action in favor 
of the defendant had the case been submitted to the 
jury on its merits. We believe that this factor is 
entitled to strong consi~eration by the Court, since 
the jury was present at the trial and had an oppor-
tunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses upon 
the stand. It is quite apparent from the jury's verdict, 
that the jury did not believe that the plaintiff was 
entitled to recover on the evidence presented in Court. 
POINTS TO BE ARGUED 
c I. THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT GUILTY OF 
NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT CONCLUSIVELY ES-
TABLISH THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS TRAVELING AT 
SUCH A RATE OF SPEED THAT HE COULD NOT STOP 
HIS AUTOMOBILE WITHIN THE DISTANCE ILLUMI-
NATED BY HIS HEADLIGHTS. 
B. THE DOCTRINE OF DALLEY vs. MIDWESTERN 
DAIRY PRODUCTS CO., IS NO LONGER THE LAW OF 
THE STATE. 
C. EVEN IF THE DOCTRINE OF THE DALLEY CASE 
IS STILL THE LAW OF THIS STATE, IT IS NOT APPLIC-
ABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
II. EVEN IF THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT 
IN OVER-DRIVING HIS LIGHTS, SUCH NEGLIGENCE 
i 
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WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE PLAIN-
TIFF'S INJURIES. 
III. THE ACCIDENT WAS SOLELY AND PROXI-
MATELY CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE 
PLAINTIFF OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE THERE WAS 
EVIDENCE FROM WHICH THE JURY COULD FIND THE 
PLAINTIFF GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
IV. THE JURY COULD HAVE FOUND THAT THIS 
WAS AN UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT, NOT CHARGEABLE 
TO THE NEGLIGENCE OF EITHER PARTY TO THIS 
ACTION. 
I. THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT GUILTY OF 
NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT CONCLUSIVELY ES-
TABLISH THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS TRAVELING AT 
SUCH A RATE OF SPEED THAT HE COULD NOT STOP 
HIS AUTOMOBILE WITHIN THE DISTANCE ILLUMI-
NATED BY HIS HEADLIGHTS. 
It is apparent from the holding of the .Court that 
the Court must have concluded that the only possible 
finding from the evidence was that the defendant was 
traveling at such a high rate of speed that he could 
not bring his car to a stop within the distance illumi-
nated by his headlights, and was therefore guilty of 
negligence as a matter of law under the rule of Dalley 
vs. Midwestern Dairy Products Co. It is our posi-
tion that the evidence is not conclusive on this question. 
It is clear from the testimony of the defendant 
.,: and the passengers in his car, that no all out effort 
\ .. 
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was made by the defendant to bring his car to a 
complete stop. He did apply his brakes but ·when it 
became apparent to him that it was doubtful whether 
he could stop his car before striking the plaintiff or 
the :\litchell automobile, he released the pressure on 
his brakes in order to get better traction, and turned 
his automobile to the right to avoid striking the 
Mitchell vehicle. 
In other words, rather than run the risk of not 
being able to stop by reason of the icy condition of 
the road, defendant adopted what appeared to him to 
be the safer course of action, which was to turn out 
and around the Mitchell vehicle. In order to accom-
plish this it was necessary that he release the brakes 
in order to obtain the necessary traction. It is quite 
possible that if the defendant had persisted in his 
efforts to stop the automobile he might have been 
successful in so doing. Whether or not he would have 
been able to do so, is a fact that can never be definitely 
known, but must forever remain within the field of 
speculation. 
It appears to us that it would be a monstrous 
proposition of law which would require an operator 
in the position of Mr. Maynard to apply his brakes 
full force when a better method of averting the acci-
dent appeared to be open. Mr. Maynard might have 
continued with full application of his brakes and might 
have successfully averted the accident completely. On 
the other hand, he might not have been able to avert 
I 
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the accident and crashed into the :Mitchell car. Which 
would haYe been the result, can never be known. The 
latter alternative would have involved the potentiality 
not only of more seriously injuring the plaintiff, but 
also any occupants in the Mitchell automobile as well 
as all the passengers in the defendant's automobile. 
Under these circurnstances, the most that could pos-
sibly be said for the plaintiff's case would he that 
,,-hether or not the defendant was overdriving his 
lights would be for the jury. The more logical view 
wo-:1ld be to say that there was no way to prove this 
fact,- that it was too highly speculative to qe sub-
mitted to the jury, and therefore the plaintiff had 
failed to carry his burden of proof on the question 
of negligence. 
\V e think that the jury might well have found, 
and in all probability would have found that the 
defendant did all that due care requir.ed, and even 
more, to avert this a·ccident. We are at a loss to 
understand how the Court could possibly hold, as a 
matter of law that the defendant was negligent. 
B. THE DOCTRINE OF DALLEY vs. MIDWESTERN 
DAIRY PRODUCTS CO., IS NO LONGER THE LAW OF 
THE STATE. 
We have heretofore pointed out that the evidence 
does not establish as a matter of law that the defend-
ant was overdriving his lights. However, admitting for 
purposes of argument only, that the evidence was 
conclusive on this point, we are still of the opinion 
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that such was not negligence as a matter of law, but 
that it was a question for the jury whether, in view of 
all of the facts and circumstances, defendant was 
guilty of negligence. 
It was strenuously argued to the Court in behalf 
of the defendant, that the harsh doctrine of Dalley 
vs. Midwestern Dairy Products Company, 80 Ut. 331, 
15 Pac. (2d) 309, no longer prevails in this state, and 
that the question of negligence on the part of the 
defendant was for the jury. 
The Dalley case was decided by a three-to-two 
decision of the Court. Mr. Justice Straup wrote a 
vigorous dissenting opinion in which he said: 
''That the plaintiff unexpectedly and without 
notice or warning encountered a dangerous ob-
struction in the highway without lights or signals 
and created hy the negligence and unlawful act 
of the defendant, admits of no controversy. He 
testified that with proper headlights, driving his 
automobile at about 25 miles an hour, and ob-
serving a careful lookout, he did not discover 
the truck until about 20 feet away. Such distance 
and rate of speed were given only as estimates." 
* * * 
"However, let it be conceded that the duty 
imposed on automobile drivers is as stated in 
such cases and in some other cases cited in the 
prevailing opinion, still whether the plaintiff 
failed or omitted to comply with such require-
ments is, on the record and so generally on a 
given state of facts, a question for the jury; and 
because a driver in the nighttime drove against 
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or collided with a substantial object unlawfully 
left or placed on a public highway without lights 
or other signals to give warning of its existence, 
does not so conclusively speak the failure or 
omission of the performance of such duty, or 
the want of ordinary care on the part of the 
driYer in the operation of the automobile, as 
to justify as matter of law the rejection of 
testimony as being false and unworthy of belief 
that the duty imposed was performed and due 
care exercised.'' 
Since that decision, this Court has criticised the 
doctrine of the Dalley case on nearly every nccasion 
that the same question has come before the 'Court. 
In some of the more recent decisions the doctrine has 
been substantially modified and its harsh operation 
greatly alleviated. 
In Hansen v. Clyde, et al., 89 Utah 31, 56 Pac. 
(2d) 1366, the decision was criticised by Mr. Justice 
Wolfe, in a dissenting opinion where he said: 
''In the Dalley case a truck was left across 
the highway without lights. When the point 
decided in that case directly comes hefore this 
court in some future case, I hope to pay my 
respects to it. At this time, I shall only say 
that I hope some rule more nearly comporting 
with the realities of travel, although perhaps 
not so logical, may be worked out whereby one 
who endangers travel by deliberately and wrong-
fully placing a dangerous obstacle in the path 
of that travel may not go scot-free because the 
traveler is in law required to see it. I think 
the traveler should be given the benefit of some 
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obstructed the highway.'' 
In the san1e opinion, :Mr. Justice \Volfe enumer-
ated a number of hypothetical fact situations and 
stated what he considered should be the law applicable 
to each of the situations. The ninth situation discussed 
by Justice \Volfe, seems to fit the facts of this case. 
Mr. Justice \Volfe said: 
"Ninth. Those cases where it is claimed 
there was a concurrence of two or more active 
negligences, but one or the other or all con-
sisted, not of the basic act itself, but of the 
manner of doing the act or omitting to do some 
incidental act which is claimed should have 
attended the basic act, and, which, if done, 
would have avoided the effect of another's 
negligence. This class is illustrated by those 
situations where someone traverses the right 
of way of another but it is claimed that the 
other was going too fast or failed to sound a 
warning and a guest passenger or other third 
party was injured. The basic act of traveling 
on one's right of way was not negligence. It 
was the overspeed or failure to give warning 
which it was claimed was negligence. The reason 
such situations may be put in a separate class 
is because they constitute cases where there is 
really an attempt to thrust on one party the 
duty to avoid the effects of the negligence of 
another and yet which do not fall under any 
situation where the last clear chance doctrine 
is applicable. The act or omission claimed to 
be negligence is not such in the sense that it 
operated on another agency in the relationship 
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of ean8P and effect to cause an <H_'(·ident but 
' that. if it had not been present the ~·ffect of 
the other '8 negligenee ·would have lwen avoided 
and the accident thus prevented. Where the 
aet of the party putting hin1self in danger was 
deliberate or he had eYery chance himself to 
avoid it as distinguished · from the situation 
where eYerything came quickly, it will generally 
be found that the cases have held that the other 
party's so-called negligence did not contribute 
to the accident. Haarstrich v. Oregon Short L. 
R. Co., 70 Utah, 552, 262, P. 100. And the 
cases have divided on the question as to whether 
a motorist's overspeed in his own right of way 
can in law be held to haye contributed to an 
accident caused by another assuming the right 
of \Yay~ One line of decisions holds that in such 
case the speeding had nothing to do with the 
accident, and that, while a person speeding 
over the course in which he had prior right 
of -..,·ay may have been negligence, yet all that 
must be taken into consideration by one who 
wrongfully assumes the right of way and that 
the placing of himself across the course and 
not the speeding was the sole cause of the acci-
dent.' * * * I have attempted to point out 
at least in the case where the one committing 
the paramount negligence had ample opportunity 
to avoid it himself, such as where there was 
a clear lookout, but he deHberately rode into 
the line of danger, the negligence of the other, 
if any, is too remote." 
In the case of Nielsen v. TVatanabe (Utah), 62 
Pac. (2d) 117, this Court made a definite departure 
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or engrafted a definite qualification on the Dalley 
case. The Court, speaking through Justice Elias 
Hanson said : 
''If the truck could not, because of some 
obstruction, be seen as plaintiff and her hus-
band approached it prior to the time they were 
blinded, and if plaintiff's husband was driving 
at a lawful rate of speed an automobile prop-
erly equipped with lights and brakes without 
any reason to believe the headlights of another 
automobile would suddenly and unexpectedly 
blind him, that while so blinded the collision 
occurred 'without time for him to reduce his 
speed or stop his automobile, the rule announced 
in the cases relied upon by defendant and here-
tofore cited in this opinion would not apply. 
Under such circumstances it may not be said 
that plaintiff's husband was, as a matter of 
law, guilty of contributory negligence. 3-4 
Huddy Cyclopedia of Automobile Law (9th Ed.) 
p. 59, No. 30 and cases there cited.'' 
This court departed further from the doctrine in 
the case of Moss v .. Christensen-Gardner, Inc. (Utah}, 
98 Pac. (2d) 363. The Court, speaking through Mr. 
Justice McDonough and referring to the Dalley case 
said: 
''While this rule is recognized generally in 
other jurisdictions as well as in our own, it 
is certainly not a rule without limitation or 
restriction. Nor does it have universal appli-
,cation. '' 
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The Court then went on to discuss other cases 
which had refused to follow the strict and harsh 
doctrine of the Dalley case : 
.. In the case of Riner Y. Collins, 132 Kan. 
613, 296 P. 713, 714, the Supre1ne Court of Kan-
sas had before it the identical problem pre-
sented in the present case. The petition in the 
Kansas case alleged that on a dark night plain-
tiff while driving along the highway ran into 
defendant's truck which had been left standing 
on the highway without any lights or other 
signal to warn drivers of approaching vehicles. 
Defendant demurred on the ground that plain-
tiff was guilty of contributory negligence, and 
the collision was not caused by defendant's 
negligence. The argument advanced in support 
of the demurrer was that the law required the 
plaintiff to drive according to his ability to see 
and that plaintiff must have been negligent or 
he would have seen the truck in time to avoid 
striking it. The court held the complaint suffi-
cient, stating that not only did the petition 
allege due care on plaintiff's part, it also 
described defendant's negligence as such that 
motorists in plaintiff's situation could not, in 
the exercise of due care, see the truck in time 
to avoid collision. Further, it was specifically 
alleged that the accident was caused by defend-
ant's negligence. 
''See also, as to the rule under discussion 
Indianapolis Glove Co. v. Fenton, 89 Ind. App. 
173, 166 N.E. 12; General Exchange Ins. Cor-
poration v. M. Romano & Son (La. App.), 190 
So. 168; Chapman v. Ind. Laundry Co., 38 Ga. 
App. 424, 144 S.E. 127; McKeon v. Delbridge, 
55 S.D. 579, 226 N.E. 947, '67 A.L.R. 311; Vol. 9 
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Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law &_Prac-
tice, Permanent Edition, page 193, ~ o. 5966. '' 
In a f-;pecial concurring opinion in that case, 1\lr. 
Justice \Volfe pointed out Yery specifically that the 
decision \\·as a departure from the logic of the Dalley 
case. He said: 
''The instant decision commendably departs 
from the seYere logic of the Dalley case in order 
to make the law comport not with logic but 
with 1~ealities-a very welcome symptom. The 
logic of the Dalley case would require that a 
driYer blinded by lights stop until the blindness 
disappear. There is in logic no more reason 
why a man should proceed when unable to see 
objects because of being blinded by the lights 
of some other car than when unable to see them 
by the lights of his own car. But as stated in 
my dissenting opinion in Farrell v. Cameron 
supra, some concession must be made to actu-
alities. In that case the implication was that 
a man on his own side of the road blinded by 
oncoming lights was under duty to discover an 
oncoming person on the wrong side of the road. 
Of course, such law should make driving at 
night on such used arterials practically an 
impossibility.'' 
Mr. Justice Larson dissented. He also recognized 
that the case departed from the doctrine of the Dalley 
case. Justice Larson took the position that if the 
Court was going to pay lip service to the Dalley case, 
that "it should follow its logic. Since the Court refused 
to specifically overrule the Dalley case, Judge Larson 
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took the position that it \Hls neces~ary to dissent in 
order to consistently follow the law. Justice Larson 
said: 
''The atternpt to dra '" such fine distinctions 
a~ in the case of ~ ielsen Y. \\' atanabe, 90 Utah 
40, 62 P. 2d 117, and in the case at bar, seems 
to be a recognition that the rule in the Dalley 
case is not sound and therefore should be avoid-
ed, even though it requires super refinements 
in reasoning and hairsplitting in logic. I think 
the Dalley case should be overruled, or the doc-
trine thereof modified so as to make possible 
a realistic approach to the problem. * * * But 
when one is unlawfully upon the highway, is 
making an unla·wful use of the highway, he 
should not be permitted to impose upon another 
making a lawful use thereof the duty of pro-
tecting him in his unlawful use. To a wrong-
·doer, the driver owes only the duty of not wil-
fully injuring him or his property. Since the 
wrongdoer is not lawfully upon the highway 
the driver is not charged with anticipating his 
presence there and is not impressed with the 
duty of protecting him to the same extent as 
he owes to one making lawful use of the high-
way. Such wrongdoer should therefore not be 
able to escape his liability by saying that the 
driver did not exercise toward him the same 
degree of care that is imposed for the protection 
of one lawfully upon the highway.'' (Italics 
added.) 
The decision rn Trimble, et 'UX v. Union Pacific 
Stages, et al.- (Utah), 142 Pa.c. (2d) 674, made a com-
plete break from the doctrine of the Dalley case. The 
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facts of that case are generically similar to those in 
the case at bar. In that case, the defendant's driver 
suffered an impairment of vision by reason of a 
foggy condition existing on the highway. In the 
instant case, the defendant was subject to a severe 
visual limitation by reason of the white coveralls worn 
by the plaintiff and the tendency to ·blend in color 
with the sno,vy background and the light colored auto-
mobile. In that case the Court specifically refused to 
follow the doctrine of the Dalley case and set forth a 
number of exceptions to the doctrine of that case. 
Speaking through Mr. Justice Larson, the Court said: 
''Appellant cites Dalley v. Midwestern Dairy 
Products Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 P. (2d) 309 and 
Hansen v. Clyde, 89 Utah 31, 56 P. (2d) 1366, 
104 A.L.R. 943 in support of the contention 
that the court should have instructed that as a 
matter of law defendant was guilty of negli-
gence. These cases lay down the rule that it 
is· the duty of a driver of a motor vehicle mov-
ing along the highway at night to so drive his 
vehicle that he can stop before colliding with 
any object within the range of his headlights. 
And further, if the lights with which the vehicle 
is equipped are not up to the standard set by 
law, the driver must reduce his speed propor-
tionately. Failure to observe this standard of 
care is negligence as a matter of law. This is 
the rule of law that we are asked to apply in 
the case at "bar. Appellant argues that since 
defendant's bus was moving at such a speed 
after entering the fog that it could not be 
stopped within the driver's range of vision, the 
driver, and his principals, the defendants were 
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guilty of negligence as a matter of law. Thus 
in effect appellants ask this court to say that 
one driving· on a highway at night is bound 
to anticipate that there will be fog, smoke, or 
some other obstruction which will reduce the 
driver's vision, and that therefore all must 
drive at such speed that should they meet with 
such an obstruction they can stop their auto-
mobile within the range of their vision as it is 
limited by this obstruction. We do not believe 
this to be the correct rule of law, or the situa-
tion to which the rule laid down in the Dalley 
case, supra, was intended to apply. In Nielsen 
v. Watanabe, 90 Utah 401, 62 P. 2d 117, 119, 
there was a situation similar to the one in this 
case. There while the driver of the plaintiff's 
car was suddenly and unex'Pectedly blinded by 
the lights of approaching automobiles, or dur-
ing the brief period of blindness which it is 
commonly known follows exposure to bright 
lights, the collision occurred, plaintiff running 
into a truck parked on the highway, without a 
taillight burning. This court there said: 'If the 
truck could not, because of some obstruction, 
be seen as plaintiff and her husband approached 
it prior to the time they were blinded, and if 
plaintiff's husband was driving at a lawful 
rate of speed an automobile properly equipped 
with lights and brakes without any reason to 
believe the headlights of another autome>bile 
would suddenly or une~pectedly iblind him, that 
while so blinded the ·collision occurred without 
time for him to reduce his speed or stop his 
automobile, the rule announced in the cases 
relied upon by defendant and heretofore cited 
in this opinion (the Dalley case, and others 
laying down the same rule) would not apply. 
Under such circumstances it may not be said 
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that the plaintiff's husband was, as a matter 
of law, guilty of contributory negligence.' Cit-
ing 4 Huddy Cyc. of Auto. Law, 9th Ed.; p. 50. 
And in l\ioss v. Christensen-Gardner, Inc., 98 
Utah 253, 98 P. 2d, 363, 365 : 'Indeed the allega-
tions that because of the glare of the headliglits 
of the other car 'it ·was impossible, in the 
exercise of reasonable care, for plaintiff to see 
said unlighted and unmarked ~barricade * * * 
in time to safely avoid 'running upon the same' 
would seem to be equivalent to alleging that 
at the point where she could have, in the 
exercise of due ·care, seen the barricade, she 
V{as blinded by the glare of such headlights; 
and the blinding light having passed, there 
was not sufficient distance between her and 
the barricade to have brought her car to a stop.' 
The court then goes on to hold that since the 
complaint by the above allegation does not show 
that plaintiff was, 'as a matter of law, guilty 
of contributory negligence', the demurrer thereto 
should not have been sustained. Other courts 
have passed on this question and in the follow-
ing circumstances, said that there was no negli-
gence as a matter of law: Vision obscured by 
dust raised suddenly by passing automobile 
(Johnson v. Prideaux, 176 Wis. 375, 187 N.W. 
207; Murphy v. Hawthorne, 117 Or. 319, 244 
P. 79, 44 A.L.R. 1397; Melton v. Manning, Tex. 
Civ. App., 216 S.W. 488) ; sudden failure of head-
lights (Mueller v. State Auto Ins. Ass 'n, 223 
Iowa 888, 274 N.W. 106); blinded by the lights 
of approaching automobiles (Kadlec v. Al John-
son Const. Co., 217 Iowa 299, 252 N.W. 103, 
Salenme v. Mulloy, 99 Conn. 474, 121 A. 870); 
when accident occurred on dark rainy day, and 
headlights of oncoming traffic blinded driver 
(I{irby v. Sweif & Co., 199 Ark. 442, 134 S.W. 
I 
l 
I 
l 
f 
l 
j 
( 
~ 
( 
I 
{ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
, . .,_, 
31 
~d 863) ; forced off the road by approaching 
aut01nobile, and when the ''weather was inclem-
ent, dark, misty and it was raining" (Fleming 
v. Hartrick, 100 \Y. Ya. 714, 131 S.E. 558); 
and when there ·was fog on the road, both when 
it ,,~as a heaYy fog occurring all along the road 
and when there were spots or zones of fog (Lind-
quist v. Schn1idt, 289 Ill. App. 614, 7 N.E. 2d 
501; ~ elson v. Inland l\1otor Freight Co., 60 
Idaho 443, 9:2 P. 2d 790; Renaud v. New Eng-
land Transp. Co., 286 Mass. 39, 189 N.E. 789; 
E'Ying v. Chapman, 91 W.Va. 641, 114 S.E. 158; 
Desoto v. United Auto Transp. Co., 128 Wash. 
604, 223 P. 1050); also where attention was 
diverted by warning signals placed on left side 
of the road, and right side was also blocked, but 
without warning signals. Miller v. Advance 
Transp. Co., 7 Cir., 126 F. 2d 442. In accord-
ance with the foregoing authorities, it was not 
error for the lower court to refuse plaintiff's 
requested instruction that defendant was as a 
matter of law guilty of negligence. This matter 
was properly left for the jury.'' (Italics added.) 
From the foregoing review of the Utah cases, it 
IS quite apparent that the doctrine of the Dalley case 
has been eaten into to such an extent that it is no 
longer the law of this state. This Court has never 
let go unpassed, an opportunity to criticise the doctrine. 
It has definitely refused to follow it, in the more recent 
cases, which have come before the court. It is incon-
ceivable that a doctrine which has received so much 
judicial criticism and which has been found to be 
so unrealistic and so wholly out of accord with modern 
day driving ·conditions, should be permitted to stand, 
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even nominally, as the law of this jurisdiction. It is 
time now, that this Court, specifically and unequiv-
ocally reject the doctrine of that case or at least 
so modify it as to make it comport to the realities 
of modern vehicular travel. 
The doctrine has been specifically rejected by the 
. Courts of many of our sister states. Those courts 
have pointed out many unsatisfactory factors of the 
doctrine, in addition to those which have been judi-
cially criticised by the members of this Court. For 
example, see the case of Morehouse v. City of Everett 
(Wash.), 252 Pac. 157, where the court said at page 160: 
"The rule contended for is, in our opinion, 
entirely too broad, and, if put in effect, would 
have very serious and unjust results. It loses 
sight of the fact that one driving at night, 
has, at least, some right to assume that the 
road ahead of him is safe for travel, unless 
dangers therein are indicated by the presence 
of red lights; it does not take into considera-
tion the fact that visibility is different in diff-
erent atmospheres, and that at one time an 
object may appear to be 100 feet away, while 
at another time it will seem to be but half 
that distance; it fails to eonsider the honest 
error of judgment common to all men, particu-
larly in judging distances at night; it loses 
sight of the fact that the law imposes the duty 
on all autos traveling at night to carry a red 
rear light and the duty on all persons who place 
obstructions on the road to give warning by 
red lights or otherwise; it fails to take into 
consideration the glaring headlights of others 
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and the density of the traffic and other like 
things which may require the instant attention 
of the driver; it does not take into considera-
tion that a driver at night is looking for a red 
light to warn him of danger, and not for a 
dark and unlighted auto or other obstruction 
in the road. 
" ( 4) We believe that, generally speaking, 
where the statutes or the decisions of the courts 
require red lights as a warning of danger on 
any object in the highway and such lights are 
not present, it is a question for the jury to 
determine whether the driver at night should 
have seen the ·obstruction, notwithstanding the 
absence of red lights. In this day when the 
roads are crowded with automobiles, a red 
light is at once recognized as a signal for danger 
and therefore for cautious driving, but the ab-
sence of a red light, where the statutes or the 
decisions of the court require them, amounts 
to an implied invitation to travel the road in 
the usual manner. In many portions of this 
state, fogs are frequent-fogs so thick that the 
driver of an automobile cannot, by means of 
his headlights, clearly distinguish an object 5 
feet in front of him. Must he stop on the road~ 
If so, all others must do the same, and thus 
all traffic must cease. And in the process of 
stopping and blocking the road, many collisions 
must occur. A rule that will force this condi-
tion is a dangerous one and must do infinitely 
more harm than good. 
"To hold that one is, as a matter of law, 
guilty of contributory negligence in not, under 
all circumstances, seeing whatever his lights 
may disclose, would be to practically nullify the 
statutes which require red lights to ~be carried 
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upon automobiles and to be placed upon ob-
structions in the streets or roads; or, at least, 
to encourage travelers on the roads, or those 
placing obstructions therein, not to comply with 
the law in those respects, for, under the rule 
contended for, a disobedience of the law with 
regard to red lights would not entail any evil 
consequences.'' 
The l\iorehouse case was followed in the. later 
Washington case of Tierney v. Riggs, 252 Pac. 163, 
where the Court said: 
''The only question, therefore, is whether 
the respondent himself was guilty of contribu-
tory negligence. The testimony shows that he 
was driving it down Madison Street from the 
Qast at a reasonable rate of speed, that as he 
neared the appellant's car there was approach-
ing a car from the west, and, in order to give 
that car proper .passageway, he shifted from 
his position in the street to1Yards the right, 
which resulted in the collision. The theory upon 
·which appellant predicates his claim of contribu-
tory negligence is that the respondent should 
have been driving his car within the radius of 
his lights, and that failure to do so constituted 
negligence. But that doctrine has been recently 
and finally repudiated by this court in the case 
of Morehouse v. Everett, 252 P. 257, and in 
that opinion prior decisions of this court, upon 
which appellant relies, were referred to and 
explained. 
"In the Morehouse case, we call attention 
to the fact that one driving a car at night is 
warranted in assuming that the road ahead of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
35 
hhn i~ safe for travel unless the dangers there 
are indicated by red lights, and that the ab-
sence of warning gin•n by red lights amounts 
to an iinplied invitation to travel the road in 
the usual 1nanner; that to restrict a driver's 
right by the • driYe within the radius of your 
lights' rule would be to encourage the placing 
of unlighted obstructions in the streets; and 
the court finally, as already said, repudiated 
that doctrine. 
''The respondent's speed being reasonable 
and his handling of his car being such as a 
reasonably prudent man would indulge in, the 
fact that on a down grade his lights did not 
reveal the obstruction left in the street by the 
appellant did not make him guilty of eontribu-
tory negligence in failing to see that object in 
time to avoid it." 
The doctrine has also been rejected by the Cali-
fornia Courts. See Sawdey v. Ra.smussen (Cal. App.), 
290 Pac. 684, where it is said (p. 686) : 
''It is a serious thing for courts to endeavor 
to establish al'lbitrary rules of safety, thereby 
assuming, to a large extent, the functions of 
the law making branch of government. The 
question of public safety is always relative to 
existing conditions. There are certain hazards 
that must remain as a part of the daily rou-
tine, and while the minimizing of these hazards 
is a goal to be earnestly sought, yet the elimina-
tion of hazard should be scientifically approached 
and with care lest in avoiding the hazard means 
of transportation be not rendered useless. To 
establish an arbitrary rule, such as here con-
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tended for, might and would give obstacles to 
traffic and dangers far greater than might ·he 
reasonably anticipated. For instance, it would 
bring all traffic down to the speed of that car 
that would be obliged to travel at the slowest 
speed in order to obey the rule. It would be an 
incentive for all cars to equip with powerful 
lights to the end that the radius of illumina-
tion might be enlarged or lengthened so as to 
permit high speed, which excessive lighting 
would be worse than total darkness as far as 
safety of traffic would be involved. It would 
serve as a defense and as an excuse for all 
manner of traffic obstruction and would dis-
turb and upset all prevailing traffic safeguards 
by making the stop test the determining factor 
in night driving. 
''Our state is spending millions of dollars 
in highway construction and in road mainten-
ance, coupled with an adequate and efficient 
highway patrol. Few accidents result from de-
fective highways, and when a road or highway 
is rendered unsafe or hazardous it is the rule 
and custom that such dangers are sufficiently 
guarded or marked as to insure little likelihood 
of injury to the traveling public. Further, the 
law required that any obstacle left in the road 
at night or after dark have displayed warning 
lights sufficient to be seen at a distance far 
greater than the radius of any practicable head-
light. With these safeguards already provided, 
it seems so unnecessary to further undertake 
to remove all hazards, at the risk of increasing 
them. 
* * * * 
"We decline to hold that, as a matter of 
law, it is negligence per se to fail to observe 
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an unlighted object of the character here in-
volved, under the conditions shown to have 
existed in the instant case. 
"Further, we cannot see the great importance 
of plaintiff's ability or inability to stop within 
a certain distance. For, as was said in Kendrick 
v~ Kansas City (Mo. Sup.), 237 S.W. 1011, if 
plaintiff had seen the truck and trailer there 
would have been no need for him to stop, as 
he could have passed it on the highway." 
(Italics ours.) 
See also the case of Sponable v. Thomas (Kan.), 
33 Pac. (2d), Page 721, where the Court used this 
language in rejecting the doctrine : 
''To determine the question as a matter of 
law, therefore, requires a consideration of the 
evidence favorable to plaintiff, and that evidence 
is that plaintiff, with car properly equipped 
as to lights and brakes and able to see forward 
some 30 feet or more, did not see defendant's 
dark drab unpainted unlighted truck,. the body 
of which stood high enough off the ground that 
it was above the range of plaintiff's lights. In 
a ·case involving the same issue as here, this 
court said in McCoy v. Pittsburg Boiler Machine 
Co., 124 Kan. 414, 417, 261 P. 30: 
'' 'The purpose of a highway is for passage, 
travel, traffic, transportation, and communica-
tion. The automobile is a vehicle used for travel, 
traffic, transportation, and communication, and 
the statute is regulatory of such use. Highways 
are not maintained for the purpose of providing 
places for storage of automobiles * * * ' Page 
418 of 124 Kan., 261 P. 30, 31. 
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''The subject of regulation by the statute 
vvas movement of automobiles on highways, in 
the sense indicated. A red light at the rear 
end visible at night \Vas deemed essential. The 
purpose w:as to provide a danger signal to ovei·-
taking traffic. 'rhe warning is more necessary 
when the automobile is at rest, than when it is 
in motion * * * '' Page 419 of 124 Kan., 261 
P. 30, 32. 
''The plaintiffs in proceeding along the high-
way had a right to believe that it was safe 
and that there were no hidden undisclosed de-
fects such as an unlighted truck standing in 
the path of travel. \Vhile the facts are not the 
same, in theory at least this case is controlled 
by the reasoning of Barzen v. Kepler, 125 Kan. 
648, 266 P. 69, and Deardorf v. Shell Petroleum 
Corp., 136 Kan. 95, 12 P. (2d) 1103. Had the 
truck in question been painted some contrasting 
color or had the body of it been low enough 
to be within the range of the headlights of 
plaintiff's car, a different situation might be 
before us, but, as we view the matter, the ques-
tion of whether there was contributory negli-
gence, on the part of the plaintiff in not seeing 
the truck, under the evidence, was not a ques-
tion of law, ,but was for the jury." 
To the same effect is the later case of Long v. 
American Employers' Ins. Co. (l{an.), 83 P. 2d 674. 
The Oregon Court has likewise rejected the doc-
trine in the case of Murphy v. Hawthorne, 244 Pac., 
page 79. The Supreme Court of Oregon said: 
"Appellant's principal contention, aside from 
the question as to the proper measure of dam-
ages, is that we should hold as a matter of law 
1 
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that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negli-
gence in failing to stop his automobile within 
the range of his vision. \Vhile some courts have 
announced a hard and fixed rule that it is 
negligence to driYe an autmnobile at such ra.te 
of speed that it cannot be stopped within the 
range of the driver's vision [Citations omitted], 
we think it improper to do so. Ea.ch case must 
be considered in the light of its own peculiar 
state of facts and circumstances. After all, the 
test is, what would an ordinarily prudent per-
son have done under the circumstances as they 
then appeared to exist f Can we say that all 
reasonable minds would reach the conclusion 
that plaintiff failed to exercise due care to 
avoid this collision~ We think not. Plaintiff 
had a right to assume, in the absence of notice 
to the contrary, that defendant would not put 
this dusty, gray-colored truck on the highway 
after dark without displaying a red light on the 
rear thereof. If the truck had been lighted, 
the jury might well have drawn the reasonable 
inference that plaintiff would have been able to 
avoid striking it. As stated in Haynes v. Doxie, 
198 P. 39, 52 Cal. App. 133: 
"Notwithstanding the facts stated, it may 
~also be true if the truck had been lighted as 
required by law, plaintiff would have been able 
to see it, and would have seen it, while at a 
distance great enough to enable him to stop his 
automobile and avoid the collision.'' 
"In H.allett v. Crowell, 122 N.E. 264, 232 
Mass. 344, it was said: 
'' 'The jury doubtless could find that the 
plaintiff's motorcycle, lighted as required by 
law, could be -stopped at the rate of speed he 
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was going within a distance of 15 feet and that 
he was about 25 yeet distant when he saw the 
rear wheel of the defendant's unlighted farm 
wagon. But the defendant was violating the 
statute, and the jury could find that the plain-
tiff did not know the wagon was ahead until 
he observed the glitter of his own headlight 
upon the rim of the right outside rear wheel of 
the wagon, when although driving at proper 
speed and immediately turning to the left as 
far as he could, he came into collision with the 
* * * wheel * * * and was injured severely. 
* * * It was therefore a pure question of fact 
whether under all the circumstances he exer-
cised the care of the ordinarily prudent traveler.' 
''In Corcoran v. City of New York, 80 N.E. 
660, 188 N.Y. 131-a case involving a similar 
state of £act-we find this significant language: 
·'' 'We are also of the opinion that the ques-
tion of contributory negligence was one of fact 
for the consideration of the jury. The auto-
mobile was going at the rate of 8 to 10 miles 
an hour, and Noyes was shown to have been 
an experienced and careful operator. Although 
the testimony tends to show that this automo-
bile, weighing 3,000 pounds, and going at the 
rate of from 8 to 10 miles an hour, could have 
stopped in from 18 to 20 feet, it is still a ques-
tion of fact whether under the conditions which 
existed the guard rail and fence were visible 
from a sufficient distance to make such a stop 
possible. It is true that one of the occupants 
of the tonneau testified that the fence could 
be distinguished at a distance of 15 feet, but 
that is by no means conclusive, for the plain-
tiff was entitled to the benefit of the legal prin-
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ciple that a traveler on a city street has a right 
to assume that all the parts thereof intended 
for travel are safe, and he is not open to the 
imputation of negligence if he fails to discern 
an unkn<>wn and concealed danger at the very 
instant necessary to prevent an impending 
disaster.' 
"While there is authority to the contrary, 
we believe the better reasoned cases support 
the holding that whether plaintiff failed to 
exercise due care to avoid the collision was a 
question of fact for the jury.'' 
The highly respected Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts has repeatedly held, in cases of this 
sort, that the question of negligence or contributory 
negligence (as the case may be), of the driver ''over-
driving'' his lights is for the jury. In the case of 
Langill v. First Nat'l Stores, !ncr (Mass), 11 N.E. 2d 
593, following Jacobs v. Moniz, 228 Mass. 102, 192 
N.E. 515, that Court said: 
"We think it cannot be ruled as a matter 
of law that where there is on the highway a 
motor vehicle, the light on which is not so dis-
played as to be visible from the rear, a careful 
driver of a motor vehicle is bound in all cir-
cumstances to see it in time to avoid it, and 
must therefore be guilty of negligence if he 
runs in to it. 
"In the instant case the speed at which it 
could be found the plaintiff was operating his 
automobile :at the time of the accident was not 
negligent in itself. Whether it was negligent 
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in the light of all the other facts that the jury 
could have found presented a question of fact 
for their determination.'' 
The same principle was adhered to In the follow-
ing later cases : 
Baker v. Hemingway Bros. Interstate Trucking 
Co. (Mass.), 12 N.E. 2d 95. 
McGaffee v. P. B. Mutrie l\iotor Tr.ansp. Inc. 
( l\Iass.), 42 N .E. 2d 841. 
Bresnahan v. Proman (1\tiass.), 43 N.E. 2d 336. 
In the last cited case the court said: 
"If the plaintiff's evidence was believed, and 
the circumstances of the accident were as he 
testified them to be, the issue whether he w.as 
contributorily negligent was one of fact. It 
could not be ruled, as matter of law, that the 
exercise of the care required him to see the 
'dark only' sooner than he did. . . . He could 
rely to some extent upon travelers obeying 
the statute in regard to lights .and according 
to common experience he could even reasonably 
expect that a tail light would be visible farther 
than the required 100 feet''. 
Other cases to the same effect are : 
Rozycki v. Yantic Grain & Products Co., 99 Conn. 
711, 122 A. 717. 
Pennington Produce Co. v. W onn (Tex. Civ. 
App.), 49 S.W. 2d 482. 
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Swift Y. :Jlichaelis (Tex. Civ. App.), 110 S.W. 
2d 933. 
\Vestern Development Corp. v. Simmons (Tex. 
CiY. App.), 124 S.\V. 2d 415. 
Gulf Brewing· Co. v. Goodwin (Tex . .Civ. App.), 
135 S. \Y. 2d 812. 
Chaffie v. Duclos (Vt.), 166 A. 2. 
Jackson v. \V. A. Norris, Inc. (Wyo.), 93 P. 
2d 498. 
Olguin v. Thygeson (N.M.), 143 P. 2d 585. 
The difficulties in cases of this sort were well 
summed up by the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
in the case of Thomas v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. 
(N.C.), 52 S.E. 2d 377. That court, like this court, 
has nominally adhered to the ''assured clear distance'' 
rule, and like this Court, has found that such a rule 
is unworkable and cannot be strictly applied in all 
cases without working substantial hardship and In-
justice. That Court, after stating the rule, said: 
"Few tasks in trial law are more trouble-
some than that applying the rule suggested by 
the foregoing quotations to the facts in particu-
lar cases. The difficulty is much enhanced by 
a tendency of the bench and bar to regard it 
as a rule of thumb rather than as an effort to 
express in convenient formula for ready appli-
cation to a recurring of actual situation the 
basic principle that a person must exercise 
ordinary care to avoid injury when he under-
takes to drive a motor vehicle upon a public 
highway at night. The rule was phrased to 
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enforce the concept of the la~ that an injured 
person ought not to be permitted to shift from 
himself to another a loss resulting in part at 
least from his o~n refusal or failure to see 
that which is obvious. But it was not designed 
to require infallibility of the nocturnal autoist, 
or to preclude him from recovery of compen-
sation for an injury occasioned by collision 
with an unlighted obstruction ~hose presence 
on the highway is not disclosed by his own head-
lights or by any other available lights. When 
all is said, each case must be decided according 
to its o~n peculiar state of facts. This is true 
because the true and ultimate test is this: What 
would .a reasonably prudent person have done 
under circumstances as they presented them-
selves to the plaintiff" 
C. EVEN IF THE DOCTRINE OF THE DALLEY CASE 
IS STILL THE LAW OF THIS STATE, IT IS NOT APPLIC-
ABLE TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
We invite the Court's attention to the fact that 
the doctrine of the Dalley case has generally been 
applied as against a plaintiff. who has failed to see 
an obstruction on the high~ay and ~ho has collided 
with the same and sustained personal injuries. In 
those jurisdictions, ~here the doctrine prevails, it h; 
held that the plaintiff is guilty of contributory negli-
gence in failing to discover the peril and to avert 
the same. There. would of course be no occasion tv 
apply the doctrine if the plaintiff ~ere able to avert 
the obstruction, by turning out or otherwise avoiding 
the obstruction, other than by stopping. The im:portant 
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thing would not be the inability to stop within the 
distance illuminated by the headlights, but rather the 
ability to avert the potential accident, either by stop-
ping or changing course in the highway so as to avoid 
a collision. The record in this case is clear that the 
defendant maintained such control over his· automobile 
as to be able to avert the peril presented by the ob-
struction on the highway, the Mitchell automobile. The 
defendant was able to and did slow his car down and 
drive around the obstructing vehicle and onto the 
shoulder of the road, which was cleared for vehicular 
traffic and where he had a right to drive. The de-
fendant would have successfully averted the serious 
consequences of this accident had not the plaintiff at 
the last moment jumped directly into his path. It 
would indeed be a harsh and unfair application of 
the doctrine of the Dalley case to hold negligent as a 
matter of law this defendant, who duly appreciated 
all of the dangers, and who not only had to consider 
the perilous position . of the plaintiff but also the 
safety of himself and the five passengers in his auto-
mobile, .as well as any persons which might have been, 
for all the defendant knew, in or to the north of 
the :Mitchell automobile. 
Even if the defendant had been traveling at a 
very high rate of speed, of which there is no evidence 
in the record, we do not see how in justice or fair-
ness he ·can be held responsible for the accident in 
~· view of the fact that he was able to avert the ob-
{ struction in his pathway. 
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It should be remembered too, that the plaintiff 
stood at the side of the Mitchell automobile, waving 
his arms to indicate his presence. This was undoubtedly 
understood by the defendant and would logically and 
reasonably be understood by any driver confronted 
with the same situation on the highway, to mean an 
indication on the part of the plaintiff that he was 
then in a position of peril and to signal the driver to 
go around. It is quite possible that the defendant 
would have attempted to go around the front of the 
Mitchell automobile even if he had been traveling so 
slowly as to be able, without question, to stop. As 
the plaintiff had indicated to him that he intended to 
remain in his present position, there would have been 
no real need or occasion for the defendant to have 
stopped, and wait until the Mitchell car was removed 
from his pathway or until the oncoming traffic from 
the north had cleared. There was an avenue of travel 
open to him over the cleared portion of the highway 
and he was entitled to use it. 
As pointed out in the case of J(endrick v. Kansas 
City, 237 S.W. 1011, referred to in Sawdey v. Ras-
mussen, 290 Pac. 684, 688, there is no great importance 
to be attached to the plaintiff's ability to stop within 
a certain distance. So long as there is an open .avenue 
of traffic around the obstructing object, there appears 
to be no reason why the plaintiff should be required 
to stop in the presence of the obstruction. All reason-
able safety requirements are satisfied when the driver I , 
i 
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chooses to proceed over an avenue of travel around 
the obstructing object. 
POINT II. EVEN IF THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLI-
GENT IN OVER-DRIVING HIS LIGHTS, SUCH NEGLI· 
GENCE WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE 
PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES. 
Under Point I C, we have strongly urged upon 
the Court the proposition that there is no duty to 
stop when there is an opportunity to go around an 
obstruction on the highway. Much of the argument 
there stated is applicable with equal force to this 
point. \Ye adopt it by reference without repeating 
it here. 
\Ve believe that it is clear from the record that 
exces·sive speed upon the part of this defendant, was 
not the cause of this accident. The record is far 
from clear that the defendant was traveling at such 
a rate of speed that he could not stop within the dis-
tance illuminated by his lights. He intentionally re-
leased his pressure on the brake pedal so as to get. 
better traction for the purpose of steering over to 
the side of the road. However, let it be conceded, for 
purposes of this argument that defendant could not 
stop within the distance illuminated by his lights. As 
above pointed out, the defendant was traveling suffi-
ciently slowly as to be able to avoid the obstruction 
presented by the Mitchell vehicle. He successfully 
~avoided injurious contact with the automobile and 
would have averted the accident completely but for 
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· the act ·of the plaintiff in jumping into his pathway 
at the last possible moment. No matter how fast or 
how slow the defendant might have been traveling, 
he could certainly not be expected to avert an accident 
where the injured party stepped directly into his 
pathway, at a moment when it was too late to stop or 
change the course of his direction. 
We invite the attention of the Court to the case 
of Grein v. Oordon (Pa.), 124 Atl. 737. The opinion 
in that case is short and we set it forth here in full: 
''In determining this appeal from the re-
fusal to take off a nonsuit, we adopt the follow-
ing excerpts from the opinion of the court 
below: 
'' 'While ascending a hill, and when near the 
top, the engine of a car in which deceased 
[mother of the minor plaintiffs] was riding 
stalled, because of failure of the ignition sys-
tem to operate; the brakes were applied and 
the car brought to rest in the middle, or very 
near the middle of the highway. ["It was a 
much - traveled road.'' ''The car was not 
dropped back to a place of safety, though it 
could have been."] There was room for traffic 
to pass on either side, and substantially the 
same amount of room on each side. The lights 
of the stalled ear went off. It was a bright 
moonlight night. The deceased and another 
young woman got out and walked up in front 
of the car when it stopped, and had been 
standing there about 10 minutes. The driver 
a young man, remained in his seat and was 
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trying to adjust the ignition and the fourth 
member of the party, a young man, was stand-
ing on the left running board, giving the driver 
assistance. Defendant's car approached from 
the rear. His lights were burning. There is 
no testimony that his speed was excessive and 
none that would warrant a conclusion that he 
did not give warning by sounding his horn. 
He drove to the right of the stalled car. The 
two young women started to the right side 
of the road, the deceased leading, the other 
a step or two behind. As the deceased was 
stepping across the ditch at the side of the 
road ["the ditch is really part of the road"] she 
was struck by defendant's car and fatally in-
jured. The surviving young woman says she 
did not see defendant's car or lights until her 
companion was struck; that, if they had looked, 
they could have seen the approaching car. [She 
testified they did not look for cars.] 
'' 'Where a vehicle has stopped, and is 
occupying the middle or substantially the mid-
dle of the highway, with sufficient space on 
either side for other vehicles to pass safely, 
a driver approaching fro.m the rear may make 
use of the unoccupied portion of the roadway 
on either side of the standing vehicle, exercis-
ing such care as the circumstances require. 
If he passes to the right, he cannot be held 
negligent as a matter of law for so doing. 
If the driver of this car and its occupants 
desired that vehicles should not pass to their 
right, it was their duty to drop their car back 
to the right side of the road, leaving the re-
m·ainder open for traffic. A standing vehicle 
does not exclude traffic from any unoccupied 
portion of the roadway that may be safely 
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used. The defendant had no more reason to 
expect that the young women would step from 
the front of the car across the road to their 
right than the driver of a car coming from the 
opposite direction and passing on the other 
side would have had to expect that they would 
step from behind the car across the road to 
their left. This is not a case of one vehicle 
overtaken by another traveling at greater speed. 
Without going into the question of contributory 
negligence on the part of deceased, in our 
judgment negligence on the part of defendant 
was not shown.' 
''We need add only that this is a clear case 
of an unfortunate person suddenly stepping 
out in front of a moving car; no other infer-
ence is reasonable from the established facts, 
recited above. The facts stated in brackets 
are taken from the record. 
''The judgment is affirmed.'' 
In Shelley v. Waguespack (La.), 100 So. 417, the 
plaintiff had jumped in front of the defendant's auto-
mobile when he was only eight to ten feet away. 
In denying recovery, the court said: 
"It is apparent from the foregoing state-
ment of the testimony that there can be no 
lia:bility attached to the defendant. The accident 
on the defendant's part was unavoidable." 
* * * 
''There was no occasion for the defend-
ant to stop his car before he was confronted 
with the emergency. He saw the plaintiff stand-
ing motionless in a place of perfect safety 
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with no indication that she intended to go upon 
the street. He had every reason to believe 
that the plaintiff saw his car approaching, and 
he had the right to assume that she would 
retain her place of safety until his car had 
passed the crossing. 
''There is no room for the application of 
the principle of last clear chance. We have 
seen that the defendant, after being suddenly 
confronted with the danger of running into 
the plaintiff, a danger which he did not and 
could not foresee, did all that was in his power 
to avert the collision, and all but succeeded. 
'' \Vhile a person driving an automobile 
is required to exercise the greatest caution 
and prudence when passing street crossings 
used by pedestrians, a like duty devolves upon 
a pedestrian; and where, in a case like the 
present one, the pedestrian attempts to effect 
a crossing without exercising his senses of 
sight and hearing, and is run into by an auto-
mobile, whose driver is without fault, and who 
had no reason to anticipate the presence of 
the pedestrian in the street, no liability can 
possibly attach to the driver of the automobile." 
In Goodson v. Schwandt (Mo.), 300 S.W. 795, 
the court said : 
"It is clear that at the instant Goodson 
discovered he was in danger of being run over 
by the third automobile he was out of the path 
or course of the truck. He became confused, 
suddenly jumped back toward the South, and 
was instantly struck by the corner of the truck's 
left fender. Ilis jumping back was the proxi-
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mate cause of the collision and of his injuries. 
We think the evidence for the plaintiff clearly 
shows that the injury to her husband was purely 
accidental and unavoidable by the defendant. 
As said in Rollison v. Railed, 252 Mo. 525, 
541, 160 s.w. 994, 999: 
'To predicate negligence on two seconds 
of time is in and of itself a monumental refine-
ment. We cannot adjudicate negligence in such 
pulse beats and hair splitting, such airy noth-
ings of surmise.' " (Italics added.) 
And on motion for rehearing the Court further 
stated: 
''As heretofore stated, it was distinctly 
and definitely proved by plaintiff's witness 
that while Goodson was out of the path and 
to the left of defendamt's truck, he suddenly 
jum'ped back and was struck by the left front 
fender of the truck. This was the proximate 
and sole cause of his death. There was no proof 
offered to sustain any assignment of negligence; 
in fact, plaintiff's evidence disproved all of 
them. But if there had been proof to support 
other averments of negligence, the fact that 
Goodson suddenly jumped back and was struck 
by the fender and so sustained injuries from 
which he died defeated plaintiff's chance for 
recovery," (Italics added.) 
:See also Klink v. Bany (Ia.), 224 N.W. 540; 
Faatz v. Sullivan, 199 Ia. 875, 200 N.W. 321. 
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POINT III. THE ACCIDENT WAS SOLELY AND 
PROXIMATELY CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE 
PLAINTIFF OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE THERE WAS 
EVIDENCE FROM WHICH THE JURY COULD FIND THE 
PLAINTIFF GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
It is the position of this defendant, that the plain-
tiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter 
of law. Based primarily on this point, we moved for 
a judgment of dismissal at the conclusion of the 
plaintiff's case, and for a directed verdict at the 
conclusion of the testimony in the case. We believe that it 
is conclusive from the plaintiff's own testimony in this 
case, that he failed to keep a proper or any lookout 
whatsoever for traffic approaching from the south, that 
he went upon the highway in light colored clothing, 
which blended well with the light colored automobile 
and the snowbank, which formed the background upon 
which approaching drivers from the south would have 
to discover him; that he failed to put out flares or 
any other warning devices to warn approaching traf-
fic of his presence on the highway and also of the 
presence of the disabled vehicle; that he placed him-
self in a position of peril upon the highway, ·with 
his back toward approaching traffic, when he could 
have given instructions to Mitchell from a point of 
safety at the side of the highway or at least from 
the north side of the Mitchell vehicle, ,,~here he would 
have been able to face oncoming traffic; and that he 
jumped directly into the path of the :Maynard vehicle. 
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We have set forth in our Statement of Facts, the 
testimony of the plaintiff to the effect that when he 
first discovered the approaching ~Iaynard vehicle, 
that it was already off the highway. It must therefore 
have been very close to him at the time it was first 
discovered, since the evidence is undisputed that the 
total distance it traveled off the paved portion of 
the highway both before and after the point of impact 
was 52 feet. It is likewise undisputed that there was 
an unobstructed view to the south for a distance of 
several hundred feet. The minimum distance estimated 
from the Wright's garage to the north end of the curve 
immediately to the south being 250 feet. Other witnesses 
estimated it as high as 400 feet. The evidence is clear 
that the curve was not a sharp one and it is reason-
ably inferable that cars on the curve should be visible 
to a .person standing at the point where the plaintiff 
stood, although the plaintiff would not be . visible.• to 
such persons driving such cars by reason of the limited 
distance illuminated by their headlights ·and the further 
reason that they would not shine in the direction of 
the plaintiff until after they had completely rounded 
the curve. Assuming that the Maynard vehicle was 
traveling at 30 miles per hour (approximately 45 feet 
per second), it would have taken more than six seconds 
to reach the point of impact after clearing the curve. 
It would have been visible for several more seconds 
during the time it was on the curve. Notwithstanding 
this, the plaintiff £ailed to discover it until it was 
almost upon him. He then did the worst thing he 
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possibly could have done, that is, to run directly 
into its pathway, although the car was then off the 
paved portion of the highway and assumedly was not 
traveling in a direction directly toward the Mitchell 
automobile. He should have appreciated that by reason 
of the light colored clothing he was wearing and the 
light color of the Mitchell automobile and the snowy 
background, that it would be extremely difficult for 
drivers to detect his presence. Therefore, there would 
be incumbent upon the plaintiff a duty to exercise a 
very high degree of diligence to observe approaching 
traffic and either to avoid the same or to give fiair 
warning of his presence. The record is clear that 
he did neither. 
We believe that the plaintiff's own testimony 
is such as to justify a holding of contributory negli-
gence as a m:atter of law. We have no doubt, that 
a jury would be entitled to find the plaintiff guilty 
of contributory negligence for any or all of the 
reasons above set forth. The Court committed preju-
dicial error of the grossest sort in holding as a 
matter of law that the plaintiff was free of con-
tributory negligence. 
\Ve invite the attention of the Court. to the case 
of Singer v. Messina (Pa.), 167 A. 583. In that case 
a truck driver parked his truck, without lights, on 
a highway, on a drizzly, foggy night. The highway 
w·as wide enought to carry four trucks abreast. The 
truck was parked in such a fashion that it extended 
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diagonally to the center of the highway, thus obstruct-
ing all of the traffic in one direction. While standing 
at the rear of the truck and hanging an unlighted 
lantern thereon, he was struck by the defendant's 
truck, and fatally injured. The defendant's truck 
was being operated at such a speed that it could not 
be stopped in a distance of less than 18 to 20 feet, 
although his visibility was only ·6 to 8 feet in front 
of the truck. The court held that the accident was 
,proximately caused, not by the negligence of the de-
fendant in overdriving his lights, but by the contribu-
tory negligence of the deceased in placing himself m 
a position of peril without indicating his presence. 
Said the Court: 
"Appellant's contention, that the primary 
negligence was that of defendant's driver in 
proceeding at a speed which did not permit him 
to stop within the distance covered by the range 
of his lights, cannot prevail. The proximate 
cause of the accident the causa sine qua non, 
was the gross failure of duty on the part of 
the deceased in parking his unlighted truck in 
the unlawful manner he did and in placing him-
self in a p1osition of obvious danger at its rear 
without indicating his or its presence by a warning 
red signal light which might have given notice 
to :the on-coming driver of the peril in front 
of him." (Italics added.) 
See also Sheely v. Ball (Ill. App.), 3 N.E. 2d 943. 
That was an action for an injury to a helper on truck 
which was being backed into a curb preparatory to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
57 
unloading, on a busy thoroughfare In the nighttime. 
The helper stepped in front of an approaching auto-
mobile which attempted to pass in front of the truck. 
The court held that evidence f,ailed to show due care 
on the part of the helper (plaintiff) and reversed a 
verdict in his favor. 
The court said: 
''The evidence is not contradicted that on 
the east side of the driveway, there were trees 
and telephone poles and that the plaintiff by 
taking 3 or 4 steps east could have put himself 
in a place of safety. . . . Instead of going east 
to a place of safety he ran west, the only way 
that a car could pass around the truck in safety. 
According to his own testimony, he ran directly 
in front of the automobile ,as it approached 
the south.'' 
:JI: * * * 
''This court is reluctant to set aside a 
verdict of the jury on the ground that the 
verdict is against the weight of the evidence. 
After reading this record, we have come to 
the conclusion that the plaintiff has failed 
to prove that just before and at the time of 
the accident in question, he was in the exercise 
of due care and caution for his own safety.'' 
See also Shelley v. Waguespeck (La.), 100 So. 
417; Pender v. Nat'l Convoy & Trucking Co., 206 N.C. 
266, 173 S.E. 336; and Smith v. Joe's Sanitmry Market, 
132 Me. 234, 169 A. 900. 
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POINT IV. THE JURY COULD HAVE FOUND THAT 
THIS WAS AN UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT, NOT CHARGE-
ABLE TO THE NEGLIGENCE OF EITHER PARTY TO 
THIS ACTION. 
Without in any way waiving the arguments above 
set forth, or conceding an infirmity in said argu-
ments, we suggest that a jury might also have been 
justified in finding that the accident here involved 
was in that class of cases known as unavoidable ac-
cidents. Clearly the defendant did all that could be 
done or reasonably could have been expected of him 
to avoid the accident, after discovering the plaintiff's 
position of peril. The jury might have found that 
the plaintiff, confronted with sudden emergency, did 
not act as an unreasonable man in darting to the east 
side of the road upon discovering the approach of the 
defendant's vehicle. In such event, neither party to 
the accident would be guilty of any negligence and 
the case would be one of unavoidable accident. In 
such case the law of course, leaves the loss where it 
falls and denies remedy to either party as against 
the other. 
See Klink v. Bany (Ia.), 224 N.W. 540. 
SUMMARY 
We believe the proposition is too well established, 
too fundamental and too familiar to require any citation 
of authorities, that in ruling on a motion for a directed 
verdict all evidence and all inferences reasonably de-
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ducible therefrom must be construed in the light 
most favorable to the party against whom such motion 
is directed. If there is any evidence in this record 
from which a jury could reasonably find that the 
defendant was not negligent; or that any negligence 
on the part of the defendant was not the proximate 
cause of the accident; or that the plaintiff was guilty 
of contributory negligence which was a causative fac-
tor in producing the accident; or if the jury could 
find from all the evidence that the accident was 
unavoidable, then the judgment of the district court 
must be reversed and the case submitted to the jury 
on its merits. 
We are confident that the record adequately sup-
ports our contention that there is evidence on all of 
these points to support a jury finding in favor of the 
defendant. We take great comfort from the fact that 
the verdict of the jury, being very small in amount, is 
strongly indicative that the jury did not believe that 
the plaintiff was entitled to recover in this case. 
Though counsel for the plaintiff have argued to the 
trial court that the jury was unduly sympathetic to 
the defendant, we trust that this Court will not be 
misled by any such assertion, which sounds strange 
indeed, coming from the mouth of the plaintiff. It 
is a fact well known to all practitioners and judges, 
that the sympathies of the jury almost invariably run 
to the party injured. This is a most normal, human 
reaction. If the jury was in any wise sympathetic to 
the defendant and antagonistic to the plaintiff, such 
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,a feeling must have derived from the apparent lack 
of candor on the part of the plaintiff and many of 
the witnesses who testified on his behalf. The testi-
mony of the plaintiff and his witnesses, was so con-
trary to the testimony of the defendant and the 
passengers in his car and so contrary to the impartial 
testimony of the .police officers who investigated the 
accident, as to justify the jury in concluding that 
the plaintiff and his witnesses committed perjury 
at the trial of this case. One of the witnesses for 
the plaintiff admitted to making an untrue statement, 
and the testimony of others was in many respects so 
inherently improbable as to defy credibility. 
Particularly was this true with respect to the 
testimony as to the icy condition of the roads. It is 
a matter of common knowledge of which this .Court 
may take judicial notice, that January, 1949, was the 
coldest month in the history of Utah weather record-
ing. The six people in the defendant's automobile, as 
well as the two police officers who investigated the 
accident all testified positively and unequivocally a~ 
to the icy condition of the road. The jury would have 
been well justified in concluding that witnesses for 
the plaintiff perjured themselves when they testified 
that the road was not slippery. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence fails 
to establish as a matter of law any negligence on the 
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part of the defendant or that any negligence on the 
part of the defendant eaused the injuries suffered 
by the plaintiff. It is further submitted that the 
evidence conclusively establishes contributory negli-
gence upon the part of the plaintiff or at the very 
least, that the evidence would support a finding of 
contributory negligence by the jury. It is also sub-
mitted that the jury might have found that the accident 
was unavoidable. The judgment of the trial court 
should be reversed with direction to enter a judgment 
in favor of the defendant, no cause of action, or in 
the alternative to grant a new trial on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN 
& CHRISTENSEN, 
.Attorneys for Defendant. 
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